OPERATION OF THE CONSENT DECREE IN THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY by unknown
OPERATION OF THE CONSENT DECREE IN
THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRYt
SINCE November 20, 1940 the motion picture industry has been operating
under the terms of a consent decree, the result of an anti-trust action
designed to eliminate some of the industry's alleged monopolistic elements.1
The operations of the industry divide basically into three stages: producing
companies lease their product through nationwide distributors to numerous
exhibitors who show the films in their theatres. However, in the process of
industry consolidation eight companies, defendants in the anti-trust suit, have
cornered the production end of the industry and have largely gained control
also of the distributing field, making the once independent distributors mere
licensing agents for their parent companies.2 And five 3 of these eight major
companies are vertically integrated firms, owning a large number of affiliated
theatres in addition to their production and distribution facilities. Consoli-
dation in the industry has likewise taken place through the formation of
chains of unaffiliated theatres. The great majority of theatres, however, have
remained independent of large chains and unaffiliated with any of the five
major theatre-owning defendants.
In its complaint in the anti-trust suit the Government sought divorcement
of exhibition from production interests. 4 In the compromise consent decree,5
however, attack was centered chiefly on certain alleged monopolistic practices
in the industry.6 The decree was consented to by only the five major theatre-
-The editors of the LAW JoURNAL Wish to express their thanks to Professor Wesley
A. Sturges of the Yale Law School for making available his unpublished manuscript on
the motion picture industry consent decree read as a Rosenthal Lecture at Northwestern
University in November, 1941.
1. See, for the background of the suit and the terms of the decree, Comment (1941)
50 YALE L. J. 854; BERTRAND, EVANS, BLANCHARD, TNEC REP., THE MoTION PicTMnE
IxNusTav-A PATrEx OF COxaOL, Monograph 43 (1941).
2. See, for a description of this development, Complaint, United States v. Para-
mount, Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 87-273 (S. D. N. Y. 1938) § III.
3. Paramount Pictures, Inc., Loew's, Inc. (successor to Metro-Goldwyn-.Mayer
Corp.), Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp., Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., and Twentieth Cen-
tury Fox Film Corp.
4. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 87-273 (S. D.
N. Y. 1940). See, for a description of other anti-trust suits concerning the motion pic-
ture industry, Whitman, Antitrust Cases Affecting the Distribulion of Motion Pictures
(1938) 7 FoRDHAm L. REv. 189.
5. Consent Decree, United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., ct al., Civil Action
No. 87-273 (S. D. N. Y., Nov. 20, 1940) (hereinafter referred to as the Consent Decree).
6. The present decree goes further than any previous effort of the Amti-trust Divi-
sion in imposing positive methods of competition upon an industry, although no "code of
fair competition" in the N. R. A. sense has been established. The nearest previous equiva-
lents of an overall "code" are probably the "Auto Finance Decrees:' United States v.
Ford, Civil Action No. 8 (N. D. Ind. 1938); United States v. Chrysler, Civil Action
No. 9 (N. D, Ind. 1938). See Isenbergh and Rubin, Antitrust Enforcenten Through
1175
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
owning defendants; the "Little Three", 7 owning no theatres, allowed the suit
against themselves to continue since many of the Government's complaints
were not applicable to them and since they were less concerned about the
threat of divorcement. The industry practices dealt with in the decree were
chiefly of two kinds, restrictions on selling and abuses built on "run" and
"clearance" provisions regulating showing. It had been the custom previous
to the decree for major producers, some of whose product is necessary for
the survival of any theatre, to sell their pictures "blind" to exhibitors, in
advance of production. Furthermore, the pictures were sold in "blocks",
often containing as many as fifty films, covering all or almost all the output
of the producer for the following season. The exhibitor buying pictures
"blind" had little knowledge of their merits beyond what they could gather
from proposed production schedules. And if the exhibitor bought any of
the almost essential output of one of the major producers, "block booking"
operated to force him to purchase all or almost all the yearly output of that
particular major. It also tended to reduce competition from the independent
producers of cheaper pictures whose chief bargaining point was the lower
cost of their product. Likewise under "block booking" the stronger exhibi-
tors secured unfair competitive advantages such as the privilege, with-
held from weaker competitors, of cancellation of a certain percent of the
"book" and the chance to "overbuy" - that is to lease more pictures for
the following year than could be used. This deprived competitors of access
to quality production.
In dealing with selling restrictions Section III of the consent decree forbids
sales except after a trade showing, and Section IV(a) prohibits sales in
blocks of more than five. Section IV(b) proscribes "forcing", i.e., condi-
tioning the sale of a feature picture on the purchase of shorts or westerns.
Sections III and IV(a) were to be of no effect after June 1, 1942 if prior
to that date a decree had not been entered against the "Little Three" requir-
ing them to trade-show pictures and limiting the number in their "blocks." 8
The second general type of alleged monopolistic practice dealt with in
the decree concerned "run" and "clearance" provisions governing the show-
ing of pictures. Distributors have classified theatres into "runs", theoretically
on the basis of their revenue producing capacity and other valid commercial
considerations such as credit standing. Pictures are first shown in a given
locality in the first-run theatres.0 They are then passed on to subsequent
run theatres there to be shown presumably at reduced rates. To protect the
Consent Decrees (1940) 53 HARV. L. REV. 386, 395 et seq.; Comment (1941) 50 YALE
L. J. 854, 858.
7. Columbia Pictures Corp., Universal Pictures Co. and United Artists Corporation,
The last is, strictly speaking, a distributing company for a group of smaller producers,
8. Section XII of the Consent Decree. See page 1178 infra.
9. The term "zoning" was adopted to designate the area over which clearance was
effective. The theatre first showing films in a zone is known as the first-run theatre.
BERTRAND, EVANS; BLANCHARD, op. cit. stpra note 1, at 40.
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position of the higher-priced, first-run theatres, a certain "clearance" 10 time
between the two showings is permitted to elapse in accordance with pro-
visions in the distributor-exhibitor contracts.
In attacking the alleged discriminatory practices resulting from abuse of
"run" and "clearance" provisions, Section VI of the decree sharply limits
the power of distributors to refuse exhibitors the grant of some run. Section
X provides that, where in the allocation of runs an inferior chain theatre
has been favored over a superior independent, there can be a reclassification
of the run ranking of the two theatres. Under Section VIII where a dis-
tributor has granted unreasonable clearance to one theatre over another,
the latter may have the unreasonable clearance reduced. These provisions
in the decree are to continue in effect regardless of the outcome of the suit
against the "Little Three."
In addition to the sections concerning selling restrictions and abuses built
on "run" and "clearance", the decree contains a variety of other provisions.
In an attempt to limit the buying power of large theatre circuits -affiliated
and chain- Section V limits group licensing to theatres located in one ex-
change district. And harking back to the original objective of divorcement,
Section XI requires, in qualified fashion, that the defendants not embark on
any general program of acquiring new theatre holdings during the three years
after the effective date of the decree.
Of great significance in the evolution of anti-trust techniques was the
substitution of mandatory arbitration for cumbersome contempt procedures"
as the primary method of enforcing parts of the decree. Consenting dis-
tributors have bound themselves to arbitrate alleged violations of these sec-
tions, and the charges can be brought by exhibitors who themselves are
not parties to the decree. The arbitration proceedings take place before
tribunals set up by the American Arbitration Association, and there is a
right of appeal to an Appeal Board. Thus, in place of the contempt procedure
normally used in enforcing anti-trust injunctions there has been set up a
relatively inexpensive framework which can readily be set in motion by the
interests previously victimized. The operation of the decree serves therefore
as a yardstick in determining the applicability of similar anti-trust techniques
in other situations.
SUBSTANTIVE OPERATION
The provisions in the decree relating to selling restrictions, Sections III
and IV, have been in operation since September 1, 1941.2 Section III
10. Clearance, as defined in the decree, is the period of time, fixed by agreement
between a distributor and an exhibitor, prior to the expiration of which a feature licensed
for prior exhibition in a theatre may not be exhibited in another theatre or theatres.
Consent Decree, § VIII.
11. See Hamilton, A Judicial Process for Industry (1941) 5 Ann. J. 50; IA=.no,
TNEC REP., Anmus-r IN Acrnox, Monograph 16 (1940) 92.
12. Because, at the time the decree was entered, pictures for the selling season then
current had already been contracted for, the provisions relating to trade shoring and
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concerning "blind selling" and presumably enforceable by court action rather
than by arbitration has not yet been litigated. Section IV prohibiting "forc-
ing" and block booking in units greater than five has been involved in
arbitration proceedings but once.13 Failure of the Government to impose
similar limitations on "blind selling" and block booking in its suit against
the "Little Three" has by the terms of the consent decree voided the appli-
cation of Sections III and IV(a) to the five consenting majors.1 4 Thus,
these selling provisions of the decree have become a dead letter in the in-
dustry.15 The question of the shortcomings of the now invalid selling pro-
visions and the desirability of new provisions is raised, however, by a
so-called united effort within the industry to reach some compromise satis-
factory to the various interests involved and to the Government.
Even before the consent decree was adopted independent exhibitors in
a hearing before the court objected almost unanimously to the selling pro-
visions.'0 Among their objections was the complaint that selling in blocks
of five destroyed the assurance of a steady flow of feature productions at
known cost which they had under wholesale block booking. The exhibitors
had principally objected only to the compulsory nature of the block booking
system 17 which had forced them to take a producer's whole line with little
privilege of cancellation. Furthermore, the exhibitors contended, licensing
in blocks of five would mean that 'distributors would give no cancellation
privileges from the book to weaker independent theatre operators.
The independent exhibitors now contend that the first six months of the
decree's operation have borne out their prediction since, according to
exhibitor reports, they "are experiencing one of the blackest years in their
history."' 8 Their chief complaint is an allegedly exorbitant rise in the price
of film rentals without appreciable improvement in the quality of new
productions. The distributors, conversely, have enjoyed a prosperous year"D
and appear pleased with the decree's selling provisions. Apparently, under
"block booking" were not to become effective until the opening of the new selling season
on Sept. 1, 1941.
13. Section IV has been involved once in combination with § VIII. See note 61
infra.
14. Communication to YALE LAW JOURNAL from Thurman Arnold, Assistant Attor-
ney General in charge of the Anti-trust Division, Mar. 26, 1942.
15. However, since the major part of the current selling season, beginning Septem-
ber 1, 1941, has gone by, there probably will be at least no immediate return to block
booking as "blind selling" on the scale that existed before.
16. On Nov. 14, 1940, before the consent decree was entered, a formal hearing on it
was held by the court. Representatives of virtually every important exhibitor associa-
tion in the industry and of the three non-consenting defendants expressed opposition to
the decree. BERTRAND, EvAzNs, BLANCHARD, op. cit. supra note 1, at 76. See (Nov. 20,
1940). See (Nov. 20, 1940) 140 VARMETY 4.
17. BERTRAND, EVANS, BLANCHARD, op. cit. supra note 1, at 24,
18. Annual Report of the Chairman of the Board, Allied States Association of Mo-
tion Picture Exhibitors, Jan. 22, 1942, at 1-3; N. Y. Times, April 19, 1942, § 8, p. 4,
col. 4.
19. Ibid.; N. Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1941, § 9, p. 5, col. 4 (financial report).
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the decree, most pictures have been sold in blocks of five rather than in-
dividually, and few cancellation privileges have been e-x-tended under the
blocks of five plan. In addition, it is likely that despite the intent of Section
IV the independent exhibitors are in no better position under the decree
than they were before with regard to forcing of inferior features in the
blocks of five2 and the forcing of shorts.
In its latest form the plan proposed by the united movement 2 ' within
the industry provides for quarterly licensing in groups of up to twelve
features.22 At least five of the twelve would be trade-shown while the others
would be reasonably well described. For all but the five trade-shown features
a cancellation privilege of at least one film is assured all exhibitors. Those
exhibitors in a weaker bargaining position would be permitted two cancel-
lations per group.
While greater concessions might have been granted the exhibitors, the
plan does assure them of some cancellation privilege, one of their chief
objectives. However, some groups of exhibitors have rejected the proposal
outright and have promulgated their own more liberal plans.2 In Minnesota
independent exhibitor organizations succeeded in getting the legislature to
pass a bill making mandatory the sale of films on a season's basis and pro-
viding exhibitors with a twenty percent cancellation right.2 4 Similar measures
are being considered in other states,2 5 and if the Minnesota Act is upheld 2 0
20. Thus before the decree the exhibitors may have received ten good pictures in a
block of fifty. Now they may receive but one good picture in every block of five. The
Department of Justice admits serious doubt that the decree's selling plan has enabled
the small independent operator to compete with the large circuit in licensing films on
any more favorable basis than under the old method of selling. Communication to YALE
LAW JouRNAL from Thurman Arnold, Assistant Attorney General in charge of Anti-
trust, Afar. 26, 1942.
21. A general meeting of producing and exhibiting companies was held in Chicago
on Dec. 9, 10, 11, 1941, at which plans were considered for the formulation of an all in-
dustry congress to handle common problems. A revision of the method of distribution
imposed by the decree was a chief aim. The conference -vas the first of its kind in the
history of the industry and resulted in the organization of a national joint conference
committee to foster industry-wide cooperation. See N. Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1941, p. 46,
col. 5; N. Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1941, p. 34, col. 3; N. Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1941, p. 33, col. 4.
22. Final Proposed Selling Plan of the United Motion Picture Industry, Sub-Com-
mittee on Trade Practices, April 1, 1942, in Box OFFiCE, April 11, 1942, at 6.
23. See Box OFFcE, far. 21, 1942, at 10.
24. Act of Apr. 26, 1941, c. 460, § 1; AfASON'S M1INNESOTA STATTrrES (Supp. 1941)
c. 21 AA. See N. Y. Times, May 4, 1941, § 9, p. 4, col. 1.
Upon application to it, the District Court, retaining jurisdiction of the consent de-
cree, signed an order excusing distributors from complying in Minnesota with Sections
III and IV of the decree. N. Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1941, p. 30, col. 2.
25. N. Y. Times, April 27, 1941, § 9, p. 4, col. 1.
26. In dismissing a criminal action brought by the state charging violation of the
statute, a lower state court in Minnesota held that the statute violated the due process
requirements of both the state constitution and the Federal Constitution. An appeal may
be taken. See Box OFricE, April 18, 1942, at 6.
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they may well be passed. On the other hand, independent producers ap-
parently liked the decree's selling provisions and oppose any return to a
plan resembling wholesale block booking and "blind selling". 27 The Govern-
ment is likewise an interested party. Since this is a united scheme, for the
industry to proceed without Governmental approval might well result in an
anti-trust action against the plan as a combination in restraint of trade.
Consequently, the various firms in the industry cooperating in the united
scheme want the new provisions written into the decree. It is doubtful
whether the Government will agree to the proposed plan. Certainly the
public interest in the quality of its motion picture entertainment demands
that there be as little "blind selling" as possible and that there be a close
check by exhibitors responsive to community film judgments on the quality
of the features purchased for exhibition in the locality.
The provisions in the decree, designed to remedy discriminations built on
run and clearance, remain in effect despite the Government's temporary
failure in its "Little Three" suit. Section VI of the decree, providing that
"no distributor defendant shall refuse to license its pictures" to an exhibitor
on some run, subject to certain conditions, became operative on November
20, 1940 (the effective date of the decree). This section has been considered
several times by the Appeal Board, and it would appear, from the Board's
interpretations, that the Section is fulfilling its intended function of pre-
venting arbitrary refusals of an exhibitor's request for at least some run. "8
In its first decision, Matter of Rubin Frels,20 the Board interpreted the
provision in Section VI that a license must be granted by the distributor
on some run upon terms and conditions fixed by the distributor "which are
not calculated to defeat the purpose of this section. . ." The Board main-
tained that an offer by a distributor may still constitute a refusal of a run
if the offer is upon "obviously impossible terms" or is not "fair and reason-
able". 30 This construction is logical and in keeping with the intent of the
decree. However, the Board's apparent disposition of the burden of proof
on this point is open to serious question. In the case the complainant
exhibitor had rejected the defendant distributor's offer of a run on the ground
that it was not "an equitable deal". The Board dismissed the complaint,
apparently on the ground that the distributor had offered some run and the
exhibitor had failed to prove that this offer was one calculated to defeat
the purpose of the Section VI.3x Under this section, the distributor may
rely upon his offer to the exhibitor as a defense to the complaint. It could
27. N. Y. Times, April 19, 1942, § 8, p. 4, cot. 3; N. Y. Times, May 3, 1942, § 8,
p. 3, col. 3.
28. Dept. of Justice Release, Jan. 22, 1942, at 2.
29. Matter of Rubin Frets, Appeal Board of the Motion Picture Arbitration Tri-
bunals No. 2, Aug. 21, 1941. (Hereinafter the citation for decisions of this Board will
be M. P. A. T.).
30. Id. at 5.
31. Id. at 6.
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therefore be argued that the burden of establishing the validity of this offer
and all its terms and conditions as being fair and equitable might more justly
be borne by the distributor who relies upon it for his defense. loreover,
it is the distributor who enjoys easiest access to the records and other in-
formation necessary to successfully carry this burden of proof.
In addition, the Board in the Frels case indulged in a rather questionable
dictum. It stated: "Of course once a distributor has tendered a license . . .
[the exhibitor] obviously cannot thereafter complain that he has been refused
a license."2 2 The implication is untenable; need a consenting defendant
make only one valid offer of a run to an exhibitor and earn total immunity
from his demands thereafter? It would be regrettable if the Board forced
exhibitors to forfeit all subsequent claims to any run under the section unless
they accept the first valid offer of any run from a distributor. If the Board
did not intend so to circumscribe the section, proper limitations should have
been made explicit for the guidance of future arbitrations. If such a restric-
tive construction of the decree were intended, it might well support an appli-
cation to the District Court for a more considered judgment.
In the second case to come before the Board under this section,3 the
defendant, a distributor affiliated with one of the integrated companies, had
refused the complainant any run on features previously exhibited in the
defendant's own theatre. The sole defense was a contention that Section
XVII nullified the provisions of Section VI with regard to a producer's
pictures distributed to its own affiliated theatres. Section XVII provides
that nothing in the decree shall be construed as a limitation of the right
of a distributor to license exhibitions in its affiliated theatres upon any terms
it wishes. The Board held that Section XVII could not be construed to
permit the exclusive run policy claimed by the defendant, since one of the
chief objectives of the decree (expressed in Section VI) was to enable inde-
pendent exhibitors to obtain pictures. This seems to be a desirable result,
for as the Board stated, the defendant's interpretation would have made
useless a large part of the decree.
The Board in its third and most recent decision under Section VI34 further
indicated its attitude toward this section. Although the arbitrator below had
dismissed the complaint, the Board directed the defendant to offer its pic-
tures for license to the complainant. A liberal attitude toward Section VI
seems justified, as the Board has pointed out, 5 since a distributor is afforded
ample protection under the decree. The distributor need grant no run if
it can show that its total film revenue in the particular competitive area will
be thereby reduced. Indeed, the distributor is further protected, for, if
32. Id. at 4.
33. Matter of John Koczak and Grace Koczak, MI. P. A. T. No. 5, Oct. 10, 1941.
34. Matter of Louis Sosna, 'f. P. A. T. No. 15, Jan. 5, 1942.
35. Matter of John Koczak and Grace Koczak, M. P. A. T. No. 5, Oct. 10, 1941,
at 4-5,
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experience should prove error in the first determination, the distributor may
initiate another arbitration.3" If the arbitrator finds that the granting of a
run in compliance with the award has had the effect of reducing the dis-
tributor's total film revenue in that area, he must vacate the first award.
There have been only six arbitration proceedings under Section X which
provides that an independent theatre may prove itself entitled to a prior run
over an inferior chain theatre unjustly favored. The infrequent resort to this
seemingly important section since its effective date, September 1, 1941, may
be primarily attributed to its over-technical requirements for suit" and the
limited character of its relief.38 Even an exhibitor who successfully proves
his claim is not guaranteed any actual relief under the decree. Although
the award may direct the inferior circuit theatre involved to negotiate there-
after for future licenses separate from its circuit, the distributor, if so
inclined, need not alter the specific terms upon which he has been selling
either theatre. In this event the exhibitor's only recourse is an anti-trust
suit in which the previously won award can prove of only indirect and
uncertain value. Relaxation of requirements for suit and provision for a
more positive form of relief seem to be necessary if the section is to be of
much use in accomplishing its purpose.
Section VIII dealing with discrimination through unreasonable clearance
has been comparatively much used. 39 A real concession to the exhibitor,40
the section rendered arbitrable his claim that the clearance under which his
theatre was operating was unreasonable and gave the arbitrator power to fix
the maximum future clearance between the theatres involved. However, a
clause in Section VIII also provides that ". . . no award made in any
arbitration under this Section shall restrict . . . the distributor's right to
license for any theatre any run which it desires to grant." The Board's
interpretation, in its first few decisions, of this limitation on the arbitrator's
authority to deal with runs, seriously restricted his power to eliminate un-
reasonable clearance 4 1 and caused confusion not yet completely resolved.
36. This is the only occasion upon which a distributor may invoke arbitration pro-
ceedings under the decree. See Consent Decree, Section VI.
37. For example, only those exhibitors are permitted to arbitrate whose theatres0
were in existence at the date of entering the decree and who made a written demand for
a better run prior to July 20, 1940. For other restrictions see Consent Decree § JOB.
These restrictions have been defended on the grounds of preventing the swamping of
the arbitration tribunals with complainants seeking valuable runs and of preventing a
rush of new theatre building by exhibitors seeking to take runs away from established
interests.
38. See Comment (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 854, 866-67; Annual Report of the Chair-
man of the Board, Allied States Association of Motion Picture Exhibitors, Jan. 22,
1942, at 3.
39. One hundred forty-four cases have been initiated under this sectiof.
40. See Comment (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 854, 864.
41. Dept. of Justice Release, Jan. 22, 1942, at 2-4.
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In its first decision under Section VII4 the Board promulgated its
definition of "run" as the time during which "the exhibitor is licensed to
show the picture" 43 and of "clearance" as "the interval of waiting time", if
any, between the conclusion of a showing in a prior run theatre and the
commencement of the next showing in a subsequent run theatre. Thus,
under this definition, the distributor in his contract of sale to exhibitor X
may agree to release a particular feature to X on a specified date. And he
may agree, in addition, that in licensing the same film to other theatres
in competition with X, he will not allow them to begin showing until a
specified time, say three weeks, has elapsed after termination of X's showing.
If, on receiving the picture from the distributor, X shows it for a week, he
would then have a week's prior run over his competitors, and before these
competitors could begin to play the feature, three weeks would have to elapse
from the time X stopped playing the film.
In its next decision under Section VIII the Board faced the necessity of
using these concepts in applying the commands of the section relating to
run and clearance. In Matter of 0. W. Leis 44 theatre X had twenty-one
days clearance over theatres A, B, and C, all in the same competitive area.
The Board held the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to postpone the release
time for B and C so as to give A seven days clearance over them, even
though it could be proved that X's clearance over B and C was unreasonably
short and even though the clearance arrangement made in the award was
"a fair and equitable adjustment." As its first ground for the decision the
Board interpreted the decree as authorizing the arbitrator only to reduce,
not to increase clearances. This is seemingly a valid interpretation of the
decree.45 However, as an additional ground the Board stated that the effect
of the award was to create a run in favor of A over B and C, something
which was beyond the arbitrator's power even though the clearance elimi-
nated thereby was unreasonable. Similarly, in Matter of Garbosc0 the
complainant's first-run theatre in Athol, Massachusetts, and intervenor's
theatres in Gardner, Massachusetts, were under like clearance in favor of
Fitchburg. In affirming the arbitrator's dismissal of complainant's demand
for a release on the same date as Fitchburg, the Board held that this "would
have given the Athol theatres the same run as the Fitchburg theatres . . .
42. Matter of Ken Theatre Corporation, M. P. A. T. No. 1, June 11, 1941.
43. Compare Matter of William Pearl, M. P. A. T. No. 26, June 4, 1942, in which
the Board apparently changed its definition to the time during which an exhibitor shows
a picture.
44. M. P. A. T. No. 7, Oct. 17, 1941.
45. However, this interpretation might likewise give rise to difficulties. Suppose in its
contract with X a distributor guarantees X twenty-one days' clearance over A, and in
its contract with A, A is guaranteed seven days over B. A then seeks to have the arbii-
trator reduce X's clearance over him to fourteen days. Could B in intervening justifiably
argue on the basis of the Lcwis case that such an award was beyond the arbitrator's
power since it would increase A's clearance over B?
46. M. P. A. T. No. 9, Oct. 31, 1941.
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and a run ahead of the Gardner theatres. Such an award is beyond the
powers of an arbitrator under Section VIII of the decree."
' 47
Certainly it is possible to argue that to give Athol the same release date
as Fitchburg creates for Athol a "run" over Gardner. On the other hand,
it is difficult to see how such an award would within the terms of the
consent decree "restrict . . . the distributor's right to license for any theatre
any run it desires to grant." For if the distributor desired to keep Athol
and Gardner on the same "availability date" he could, after the award, have
reduced Fitchburg's clearance over Gardner to the clearance given Fitchburg
over Athol.48
In Matter of Raritan Amuselnemnt Co., Inc.,49 a later case, in a situation
analogous to that in the Garbose case, the Board reached the opposite result
apparently on the basis of the rationale suggested. Here, complainant's Play-
house Theatre at Raritan was under twenty days clearance to intervenor's
theatre in Somerville. Somerville also enjoyed fourteen days clearance over
Manville from two distributor defendants and seven days from two other
defendants. All the theatres were in the same competitive area. The Board
sustained an arbitrator's award reducing Somerville's clearance over Raritan
to seven days. In rejecting the contention that this reduction created for
complainant a run prior to Manville, the Board said, "Manville has no
run ahead of Raritan; nor has it any clearance over Raritan in any contract.
Both are subject to clearance from Somerville. The reduction of this clear-
ance does not restrict in any way a distributor's right, under Section VIII,
to license Manville for a run ahead of Raritan, with or without clearance
or Manville's right to negotiate for such a run.'' 0 Although this seems
the more desirable result, it leaves the position of the Board uncertain.
The definition of run, adopted by the Board, as the time "during" which
the picture is being shown leaves open the possibility that the distributor
may legally nullify the "reduction of unreasonable clearance" provision in
Section VIII by merely "milking" the run. This is accomplished by allowing
d prior run theatre an unreasonably long period of run rather than an un-
reasonably long period of clearance. Then, even though the next subsequent
exhibitor be allowed to play within twenty-four hours after the end of the
prior run, he may still be greatly injured; and under Section VIII the
arbitrator has no power to adjust the unreasonably long run period. While
Section X offers some hope of adjusting this disparity, the inadequate char-
acter of that section has already been noted. On the other hand, if "run"
had been defined by the Board as "starting date" alone, all theatres starting
at time one would be on run one, and those (in the same competitive area)
47. Id. at 6.
48. In the Lewis case, however, the arbitrator in his award expressly granted A
seven days' clearance over B and C. This would seem to be clearly beyond his power.
49. M. P. A. T. No. 11, Nov. 28, 1941.
50. Id. at 4.
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who started at time two would be on run two regardless of whether time
two is five days or five minutes later than time one. And this would be
true even though the second run might start before the first one was ter-
minated. Clearance would then comprise the whole period between the
starting times including that period during which the feature is being shown
in the prior run theatre. That playing period would then likewise be subject
to reduction if found unreasonable by the arbitrator. Such a definitiun
would eliminate the possibility for abuse by "milking" the run present under
the Board's definition.
In addition to the confusion engendered by its stand on Section VIII
concerning restrictions on abolition of unreasonable clearance, the Board
seems to have limited unnecessarily the extent to which an arbitrator may
reduce a period of clearance after having found it unreasonable.51 In Matter
of Garbose52 the Board held that the reduced period of waiting time "cannot
be less than a day of twenty-four hours" when "the theatres involved are
in the same competitive area." This holding seems at odds with the purpose
of Section VIII to eliminate unreasonable clearance. Certainly, where the
two theatres are not in the same competitive area the arbitrator may com-
pletely eliminate clearance between them.53 And it is frequently the prac-
tice in the industry to have subsequent runs follow immediately the prior
showing with no intervening clearance ;54 there is nothing in the decree which
forbids fixing a five minute clearance.
It must be noted that the Board's more recent decisions under Section VIII
have shown a marked liberalization of its views.m For example, in its third
decision5G the Board approved the act of the arbitrator in holding that he
had no power to make an award which would adversely affect the interests
of an exhibitor named in the complaint as having an unreasonable clearance
over the complainant but who had deliberately foregone his opportunity
to intervene. Under such an interpretation the decree could be nullified
by any unaffiliated theatre complained against which chose to ignore
the arbitration proceeding. Fortunately, however, in its twelfth opinion"
the Board, without explanation, appears to have reversed this holding.
In that case, two duly notified interested theatres had not intervened
and the arbitrator ruled "he could not consider the position or the
51. Dept. of Justice Release, Jan. 22, 1942, at 3.
52. M. P. A. T. No. 9, Oct. 31, 1941.
53. Matter of St. Lawrence Investors, Inc., I. P. A. T. No. 4A, Nov. 7, 1941.
54. See MoTlox PiCruRE HERALD, Jan. 3, 1942. The Board has likewise tended to in-
dulge in de minimis perfectionism in working out applications of concepts such as clear-
ance which must at best be rough approximations. See Dept. of Justice Release, Jan.
22, 1942, at 2-3.
55. Even the exhibitors have conceded this. Communication to YAsim L..V JOUas'AL
from the Allied States Association of Motion Picture Exhibitors, April 4, 1942.
56. Matter of Westway Theatre, Inc., M. P. A. T. No. 3, Sept. 22, 1941.
57. Matter of Esquire-Great Neck Corporation, M. P. A. T. No. 12, Dec. 5, 1941.
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rights and wrongs of these theatres." The Board held this error, This
holding seems fully justified in view of the decree provisions which, recog-
nizing that the real party in interest in a clearance proceeding under Section
VIII is the exhibitor possessing the unreasonable clearance, give ample
notice and opportunity to intervene to this exhibitor. Furthermore, in six
out of the last seven appeals under Section VIII, the Board has in some
respects gone further than the arbitrator in reducing or preventing the
creation of unreasonable clearance. There can be no doubt that a liberaliza-
tion of the terms of the section and the Board's consistent interpretation
thereof is essential if the abuses alleged in the Government's petition are to
be checked.
The Department of Justice openly recognizes that the section has for a
substantial number of situations failed to provide adequate relief to the extent
which the Sherman Act requires.58 It will therefore recommend, at the
conclusion of the test period, modification of the section in preference to
continuance in its present form. Another desirable change would be some
definite provision for a late-run exhibitor who is frequently injured more
by having to follow an excessive number of affiliated theatres than by fol-
lowing any one of them by an excessive number of days59 Nor is it clear
that adequate remedy is assured in a situation such as the following.
Exhibitor A is under 7 days clearance to Y; Y is in turn under 21 days
clearance to Z. Assume Y's clearance over A is reasonable but the 28 day
waiting period indirectly created between A and Z is onerous. A should
be empowered to attack as unreasonable the actual protection accorded Z
or in some manner to telescope the aggregate time required for a feature
to reach his theatre.
Among the miscellaneous sections dealing neither with formal selling
restrictions nor run and clearance abuses, Section V prohibits a distributor
from licensing features under a single license to theatres located in more than
one exchange district. The purpose of the section was to break up to some
extent the powerful mass buying position of the large chains and groups
of affiliated theatres. Presumably the smaller groups of independents would
then be on a more equal bargaining level with the large chains.
A complete absence of claims under Section V cannot reflect the suc-
cessful constriction of the purchasing power of larger nationwide circuits.
Its inactivity is more reasonably indicative of the inadequate character of
the relief and incentive offered a potential complainant. The offending dis-
tributor is at most obliged to pay a fine of $500 into an overhead fund for
maintenance of the arbitration facilities, an award of no benefit to the ex-
hibitor. The exhibitor professes a fear of filing these complaints against
a distributor with whom he must continue to deal and who is in a position
58. Dept. of Justice Release, Jan. 22, 1942, at 4.
59. Id. at 3-4.
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to retaliate by "selling away to competitors" and raising film rentals." If
exhibitors are unwilling to testify in the arbitration tribunals, they probably
would be equally unwilling to do so in court, and under these circumstances
it is difficult to perceive how the Government can help them. But while his
hesitancy is in the long run to his disadvantage, it is unrealistic to expect
an independent exhibitor to hazard the policing of this section in return for
the little concrete relief presently offered.
For similar reasons Section IX remains practically undisturbed.0 ' This
section purported to prevent a distributor's withholding from one exhibitor
prints available in its exchange for the purpose of giving another exhibitor,
usually competing on the same run, a prior playing date not in the contract.
However, under Section IX when too few prints are available at the exchange
for the date desired by both theatres, the distributor is left to his discretion.
Moreover, it must be found that the distributor has pursued a policy of with-
holding these prints; the award directs him to discontinue this policy. An even
more serious objection is the exhibitors' contention that this section missed
the target completely in that prints are not usually withheld for the purpose
of creating a play date not specified in the license. 2-' Prints are withheld,
they contend, in order to grant to a prior run theatre clearance not specified
in its contract. If this is true, an additional section is imperative if the
discrimination is to be eliminated.
Section VII would subject to arbitration an exhibitor's demand for can-
cellation of a feature on the ground it was found to be generally offensive
to his locality on moral, religious or racial grounds. The total absence of
complaints under this section, in operation over a year, probably indicates
some corresponding scarcity of offensive releases.63 The influence of the
decree in this regard is conjectural. The true effectiveness of the section
will not be shown until modification is made in its present requirement that
an exhibitor notify the distributor of his objections within ten days after
the final license negotiation. Actually, the feature's first public showing ma,
not have been held until well over ten days after such negotiation. Local
reaction cannot be accurately ascertained until that time. An exhibitor plan
to change this limit upon the time of notice to "within a reasonable amount
of time after the contract is approved" appears far more logical and should
be adopted.
60. Communication to YALE LAW JOURNAL from the Allied States Association of
Motion Picture Exhibitors, April 4, 1942.
61. This section has been invoked in two cases in which the more active Section VIII
(clearance) was also invoked. It was probably the latter section which provided incentive
for the institution of suit.
62. Communication to YALE LAW JOURNAL from the Allied States Association of
Motion Picture Exhibitors, April 4, 1942.
63. Exhibitors feel that there have not been many offensive pictures released in
recent years. Communication to Y.!LE LAW JOURNAL from the Allied States Association
of Motion Picture Exhibitors, April 4, 1942.
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Finally, Section XI prohibits in qualified fashion a general program of
theatre expansion by the majors. This provision is the closest approach in
the decree to the problem of divorcement, which, as stated above, was the
original aim of the anti-trust suit. It was weakly conceived and has been
similarly weak in execution. Although it provides that for a period of three
years no consenting defendant shall enter upon a general program of ex-
panding its theatre holdings, reports made to the Department of Justice
indicate that defendants have acquired interests in approximat6ly 150
theatres.6 4 The Department alleges that this exceeds by more than 100 the
number of theatre interests disposed of by them since the entry of the
decree.65 Some of these acquisitions have been in towns where the defendants
held no previous iterests; in others, the public is now forced to attend one
of the defendant's theatres or forego motion picture entertainment. It is
further alleged that some of these acquisitions have been made to prevent
the prosecution of complaints by competitors through legal proceedings or
arbitration. 6 However, even these abuses may perhaps be protected tinder
a "weasel" clause which permits acquisitions by a defendant "to protect
its investment or its competitive position or for ordinary purposes of its
business." The Government, aware of this weakness, has begun suit to test
the section and petitions have been filed against Paramount 7 and Twentieth
Century-Fox 6s who appear to have acquired interests in 87 and 40 theatres
respectively and disposed of 21 and 10.09 The petitions allege all the viola-
tions enumerated above and pray the court to order each defendant to divest
itself of all interests acquired after November 20, 1940 and any further relief
the court may deem proper. It must be recalled that the Government's
suit alleged as necessary divorcement of. affiliated theatres from production
interests.1 0 Under Section IX the Government is to forego divorcement
action and the defendants are to forego an expansion program for three years.
The Government maintains it has not relinquished the idea of complete
64. Dept. of Justice Release, Jan. 22, 1942, at 5.
65. Ibid.
66. Id. at 5-6.
67. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., Civil Action No. 87-273 (S. D. N.
Y. Jan. 29, 1942).
68. United States v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation and National Thea-
tres Corporation, Civil Action No. 87-273 (S. D. N. Y. Jan. 29, 1942).
69. Petition, United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., Civil Action No. 87-273
(S. D. N. Y. Jan. 29, 1942) at 4-8; Petition, United States v. Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corporation and National Theatres Corporation, Civil Action No. 87-273 (S. D.
N. Y. Jan. 29, 1942) at 4-6.
70. The original complaint attacked the large scale vertical integration of produc-
tion and exhibition as the principal cause of restraint and monopoly in the industry, and
prayed for divorcement of exhibition from production as the major form of relief. Com-
plaint, United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 87-273 (S. D.
N. Y. 1938). See especially 133, 173-98; 222-26, and Prayer, 4-6. See Comment (1941)
50 YALE L. J. 854-58.
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divorcement ;71 very likely the outcome of the present trial will largely deter-
mine the Government's future course.
PROCEDURAL OPERATION
Procedurally, the decree aimed to eliminate the expensive and time-con-
suming litigation generally attendant upon the enforcement of consent de-
crees32 To this end, the impartial American Arbitration Association was
appointed to set up and administer a system for arbitrating exhibitor claims
of distributors' violations of the decree.7 3 That the physical equipment, per-
sonnel, forms and other facilities provided by the administrator have been
eminently satisfactory, there can be no doubt.7 4 By February 1. 1941, 72
days after the entry of the decree, there had been established 31 nation-wide
Motion Picture Arbitration Tribunals in which exhibitor Demands for
Arbitration might be filed.75
The number of proceedings initiated by complaining exhibitors, their con-
duct and results, will be basic factors in analyzing the decree's operation.
From the opening of the Tribunals through March 31, 1942, there have been
initiated in thirty of the thirty-one tribunals a total of 199 claims.7 0 Of these,
95 were carried to awards, 47 settled or withdrawn, while 57 awards are
pending. The complaining exhibitor has been successful in 46 of the awards,
the defending distributor in 49. With insignificant exception, only three of
the seven arbitrable sections of the decree have been invoked.
7T
Parties dissatisfied with the decree contend that the number of claims initi-
ated thus far is small enough to indicate an eventual failure of the system.
But in fact under few statutes are so many cases brought within a year of its
effective date. In addition, the availability of the machinery has concededly
induced many settlements which made resort to the tribunals unnecessary.7 8
It is further alleged that a previously large number of exhibitor grievances
71. Dept. of Justice Release, Jan. 22, 1942, at 6.
72. HA.SILTOx, TNEC RE'., ANTITR.ST IN A-rox. Monograph 16 (1940) 92.
73. Consent Decree § 22. See, for a description of the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation, Eastman, Foreword (1937) 1 AmB. J. 1; Odium, The Naticnal Systmnn of M1e
American Arbitration Association (1937) 1 AmR. J. 6.
74. Dept. of Justice Release, Jan. 22, 1942, at 1.
75. Consent Decree § 22 provides for a tribunal in each city in which three or more
distributor defendants maintain exchanges.
76. These statistics and those which follow have been compiled from records at the
central office of the American Arbitration Association, 9 Rockefeller Plaza, New Yorl:
City.
77. The three most active sections have been §§ VIII (clearance) 144 cases, VI (evme
run) 30 cases and X (designated run) 6 cases. The inactive sections have been IV, V,
VII and IX. See Comment (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 854, 859-64, 864-68.
78. Communication to YALE LAW JOURNAL from Thurman Arnold, Assistant Attor-
ney General in charge of Anti-trust, Mar. 26, 1942. Dept. of Justice Release, Jan. 22,
1942, at 5.
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continually submitted to the Department of Justice as well as the number of
exhibitor anti-trust suits against distributors has been substantially reduced.70
For a program designed to eliminate time-consuming court litigation, the
record thus far is not over-encouraging. In the 95 cases carried to awards,
there has elapsed an average of 105 days between the filing of a Demand and
the arbitrator's award.8 0 The shortest period was 27 days, the longest, 371;
the average actual hearing time was two days. Although the arbitrations have
consumed less time than the usual court litigation, various improvements must
still be made. The maximum time under the decree for bringing a cause
before an arbitrator after filing the demand is 27 days. 8' The lapse of longer
periods is due solely to postponements for the convenience of parties and
counsel. It appears that where an exhibitor has suffered so long the types of
abuse complained of, ultimate relief, though unnecessarily delayed, may still
seem to him quite satisfactory. Experience may demonstrate that the time
prescribed for notice, re-notice and selection of the arbitrator8 2 can be some-
what shortened without harm. The same may be said regarding convenience
of counsel. Greater need of modification is found in the present method of
procuring simple evidence through tedious testimony and cross-examination.
Conferences could be arranged through which parties might agree upon pre-
paration of certain documentary proof to be submitted as stipulations at the
hearing."3 The Appeal Board has also suggested8 4 that exhibitors confine
their proof to those factors which the arbitrator is required to consider.8"
Moreover, in many cases certain of these factors are developed to unneces-
sary lengths.8 6 It is also unfortunate that the comments of counsel often fill
more space in the transcript than the testimony of witnesses.87 The arbi-
79. (Nov. 8, 1941) 146 MoTIoN PicruRE HERALD 27.
80. See note 76 supra.
81. See Rules of Arbitration and Appeals Pursuant to Sub-Division 6 of Section
XXII of the Decree and accompanying the Decree (hereinafter referred to as Rules of
Arbitration and Appeals).
82. Rules of Arbitration and Appeals, §§ I and III.
83. See Warburg, First Quarterly Report of the Motion Picture Arbitration Tri-
bunals (1941) 5 Aa. J. 185, 187. The Washington Tribunal originally tried this plan
with promising success. The procedure saved the time, not only of the arbitrators and
the parties, but of the several witnesses who would have been called upon to bring docu-
ments from their offices and remain at the hearing while the data sought were obtained
from them by testimony and cross-examination.
84. See, Matter of Fred W. Rowlands, M. P. A. T. No. 13, Dec. 26, 1941, at 8.
85. Section VIII of the Consent Decree prescribes seven specific factors (e.g., his-
torical development of clearance in the area, admission prices, character and location, etc.)
which the arbitrator must weigh in determining reasonable clearance.
86. Records of cases show, for example, that the testimony regarding historical de-
velopment of clearance in the particular area wherein the theatres involved are located is
unnecessarily prolonged. Only in exceptional cases when there have been violent changes
in clearance schedules need this factor be so painstakingly developed.
87. See Matter of St. Lawrence Investors, Inc., M. P. A. T. No. 4A, Nov. 7, 1941,
at 5.
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trator, by judicious handling of the proceeding, may to some extent control
these latter aspects. gut only sincere efforts by parties and counsel can effect
the substantial reduction in time which had been anticipated.
The cost factor, another important criterion, is not so easily appraised for
want of complete data. 8 However, the per case costs of arbitration, in many
cases divided between the parties by the arbitrator's assessment, appear to
be as follows:
Exhibitor Demanding Arbitration:
Average filing costs as assessed .............. 10.95
Average arbitrator's fee ..................... 11.64
Average stenographic costs .................. 35.64
58.23
Defending Distributor (per distributor) :
Average filing costs as assessed .............. 1.44
Average arbitrator's fee .................... 3.45
Average stenographic costs ................. 24.75
29.64
It is important to note that these figures do not include costs for coun-
sel. 9 While the principal expense appears to be the stenographic costs, it is
certain that attorney's fees are at least of equal proportion. Neither of these
expenditures lies within the control of the decree or the Administrator. Higher
average costs have fallen to the exhibitor complainants because in almost all
cases there were a number of defendants who shared the assessed costs while
the complainant bears his share alone."' Although the decree would permit
an arbitrator's fee of $50 per day, 1 by the administrator's determination the
arbitrator receives only an honorarium of $10 for each day of hearing.32
Even this token, although commendable, is not essential and may be discon-
tinued without objection. A reduction in the length of proceedings will
reduce the arbitrator's fee, may reduce counsel's fee and is the only method
of restricting stenographic costs.
The foregoing averages do not include the cost of maintenance of facilities
which is borne entirely by the distributors. 3 First year operations, for which
88. See note 76 supra.
89. Retained by all parties in approximately 905% of the cases. Warburg, Second
and Third Quarterly Reports of the Motion Picture Arbitration Tribunals (1941) 5 Amn
J. 286, 290.
90. Ibid.
91. Rules of Aribtration and Appeals, Section XI.
92. See Warburg, First Quarterly Report of the Motion Picture Arbitration Tri-
bunals (1941) 5 A-m J. 185, 188.
93. Consent Decree, § XXII, Sub-Division 8. Each consenting defendant is assessed
by the administrator in amounts proportionate to their respective yearly gross receipts
from licenses for exhibition. The filing fees and the fines imposed under §§ IV and V
of the decree also go into this fund.
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the decree provided $490,000,04 were administered at an actual cost of
$300,000. The Budget Committee named by the court has requested, for
operations in 1942, $294,000, plus a $25,000 contingency fund, 0 although
the decree would permit an expenditure of $4-50,000.Y It may be contended
that $300,000 is still a high price for less than 150 arbitrations per year.
Probably the industry has not received full value for the over-all costs, not-
withstanding their reasonableness. An improved decree would achieve greater
results for the same expenditure. Conversely, if and when the machinery
successfully enough adjusts the internal disputes of the industry, it will have
assured self-regulation at a trifling investment.
Regarding the panel of 1,171 persons available as arbitrators,08 there has
been much praise and little criticism. 90 The Department of Justice does
believe that the arbitrators' unfamiliarity with the industry, prescribed by the
decree, 10 0 has "given added weight to the superior presentation" of the distribu-
tors' cases. 101 It is alleged that the distributors enjoy an important advantage
over the exhibitors in that the former have access to legal talent which is
more fully acquainted with the industry's technical problems. Undoubtedly
expert knowledge in an arbitrator would expedite full and rapid comprehen-
sion, sifting and weighing of proof.'0 2 But the desiderata of impartial deci-
sion and preclusion of valid suspicion that either party dominates the decree
have been admittedly secured in a manner which justifies retention of the re-
quirement. 103 Moreover, the problem of assuring the independent exhibitor
expert presentation of his case is one which national and regional associa-
tions of exhibitors can solve. A final suggestion may be made regarding the
form of the arbitrator's award. Certain sections specifically enumerate
matters which the arbitrator shall consider and the findings he shall make in
determining the award. 0 4 There is no requirement that his considerations
or findings be specified in the award and the Appeal Board has often com-
plained that the arbitrator does not state the reasons underlying his deci-
sion. 10 5 The requirement of a written elucidation of these considerations
would immeasurably aid an Appeal Board unfamiliar with these local data.
94. Consent Decree, § XXII, Sub-Division 5.
95. N. Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1941, p. 17, col. 2; N. Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1941, § 9, p. 5,
col. 5.
96. N. Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1941, § 9, p. 5, col. 5.
97. Consent Decree, § XXII, Sub-Division 5.
98. Records of the American Arbitration Association, 9 Rockefeller Plaza, New York
City.
99. See MOTION PicruRE HERALD, Jan. 3, 1942, which severely criticizes the decre
but praises the calibre of the arbitrators selected and the efficiency of the administrator.
100. Rules of Arbitration and Appeals, Section II.
101. Dept. of Justice Release, Jan. 22, 1942, at 1.
102. KiELoR, ARiTRATIoN IN ACTION (1941) 21-22, 100.
103. See note 100 supra.
104. See note 85 mrpra.
105. See Matter of Main Theatre, Inc., M. P. A. T. No. 14, Dec. 26, 1941, at 2-3,
and Matter of Lucien Descoteaux, M. P. A. T. No. 6, Oct. 17, 1941, at 4-5.
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A three man Appeal Board appointed by the court has jurisdiction to de-
termine appeals upon any ground from the arbitrator's award. 10  The
Board has utilized its powers to affirm, modify, and reverse these awards
and to remand for further proceedings in accordance with its decision. As
does a court, the Board now cites and relies upon its former decisions as
binding precedents' 07 and has attempted to round out, elaborate and give color
to the substantive and procedural provisions of the decree.'03 Thus far there
has been filed a total of 30 appeals. 0 9 The Board has rendered 20 decisions,
2 appeals have been withdrawn, and 8 decisions are pending. Of the 20
decisions rendered by the Board, 7 have, broadly speaking, modified the award
of the arbitrator, 7 have reversed the award, and 6 have affirmed the findings
below. Ten decisions have been in favor of the exhibitor complainant and 10
in favor of the defending distributor. The period between the arbitrator's
award and the decision on appeal averaged 97 days; an average of 200 days
elapsed between the filing of the Demand and the Appeal Board's decision.110
It should be noted that a party may appeal not later than 20 days after the
filing of the arbitrator's award." 1 Records indicate that in most instances
the appeal was filed on the last day. Within 30 days after the filing of the
Notice of Appeal, copies of briefs are exchanged by parties; ten days are
allowed to file return briefs. Hence, a total of 60 days is allowed the par-
ties actually to bring the cause before the Board," 2 and in most cases the full
time is taken. There appears to be at least one expedient method of reducing
this time. Parties are at present required to obtain the Board's permission for
oral argument." 3 There can be little reason for a denial of this request.
The Board's work to date has not been burdensome, and argument by com-
petent parties, especially as it relates to local conditions and practices, may
be of genuine assistance to the Board. Elimination of the petition for oral
argument and substitution of automatic permission therefor could reduce by
10 days the time on appeal. Costs on appeal other than the !25 filing fee
are not accurately available."
4
106. Consent Decree, § XXII, Sub-Division 7; Rules of Arbitration and Appeals,
§§ XIV-XIX.
107. See 'Matter of St. Lawrence Investors, Inc., M. P. A. T. No. 4A, Nov. 7, 1941,
at 4, and Matter of Esquire-Great Neck Corporation, M. P. A. T. No. 12, Dec. 5, 1941,
at 10.
108. See, for example, Matter of Ken Theatre Corporation, M. P. A. T. No. 1, June
11, 1941, at 5-7.
109. From the records of the American Arbitration Association through Mar. 31,
1942.
110. See note 76 supra.
111. Rules of Arbitration and Appeals, § XIV.
112. Rules of Arbitration and Appeals, § XVI.
113. Ibid.
114. These costs would, however, include the expense of printing the record and fees
of attorneys where they are used.
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CONCLUSION
The first stages in the operation of the decree have shown that a liberal
interpretation of it by the arbitration tribunals is a prerequisite to the achieve-
ment of its avowed objectives. Arbitration has often been successfully ap-
plied as a method of settling internal disputes of an industry and affording
it a measure of self-regulation. 115 But the arbitration here imposed is unique,
since its substantive and procedural rules are expressly set forth in a single
instrument analogous to a statute.16 This necessity for the tribunal to inter-
pret a law as well as to consider a fact situation has rigidified to some extent
the customarily flexible arbitration proceeding. Nevertheless, with slight
modification 1 7 a procedural mechanism efficient to the extent the parties
chose to make it so should be available for adjustment of disputes. To date
completely effective use of arbitration under the decree has been hampered
by exhibitor non-cooperation resulting from their hostility to parts of the
decree." 8 Removal of restrictions on initiation of complaints and provision
for more adequate awards should remedy this in part. The procedural ma-
chinery for arbitration apparently represents an advance over contempt meth-
ods for policing anti-trust decrees although as yet its fullest possible benefits
probably have not been realized.
With the broad limitations inherent in the decree it is still an open ques-
tion whether under it the advantages of competitive conditions can be re-
stored to the industry. The decree has been more or less effective in dealing
with some abuses such as unreasonable clearance and refusal to grant a run
on some terms. And it has stimulated a movement within the industry look-
ing toward self-regulation of some of its abuses. But by its terms the decree
effected no fundamental change in the competitive structure of the industry;
rather it tended to freeze the present pattern of competition. Most of the
115. See Sturges, Kent, Grossman, Nordlinger, Popkin, Jacobson, Fraenkel, Isaacs,
Robinson, Deller, Nussbaum and Everett, A Symposium on Commercial, Industrial and
International Arbitration (1940) 17 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 495; KELLOR, A3InMATION IN
AcToN (1941) 3-15.
See, for history and evaluation of consent decrees in antitrust enforcement, Isenbergh
and Rubin, Antitrust Enforcement Through Consent Decrees (1940) 53 HARv. L. REv.
386; Katz, The Consent Decree in Antitrust Administration (1940) 53 HARV. L. Rv.
415.
116. See KLLOR, ARBITRATION IN ACTION (1941) 206-07.
117. On the general problem of modification of consent decrees in antitrust regulation
see Donovan and McAllister, Consent Decrees in the Enforcement of Federal Anti-
Trust Law (1933) 46 HARv. L. Rxv. 885.
118. Since exhibitor complaints to the Department of Justice provided the immediate
incentive for the Government suit, they were at first known as the "beneficiaries" of
the decree. Nevertheless, unaffiliated exhibitor interests strenuously opposed the entry of
the decree. See note 16 supra. Although after its entry, many exhibitor associations
promised to cooperate, it is doubtful if any whole-hearted effort was ever made. But cf.
Annual Report of the Chairman of the Board, Allied States Association of Motion Pic-
ture Exhibitors, Jan. 22, 1942, at 1-3.
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abuses alleged in the original petition have remained untouched.110 Thus,
the monopoly control resulting from the majors' ownership of most of the
important first-run theatres still exists. Likewise, no effective steps have been
taken to deal with the majors' cooperation among themselves and the simi-
larity of their actions with regard to independents. In addition, there remains
the threat of abusive practices arising from the power of unaffiliated chains
of theatres m° As the decree now stands, the many escape clauses available
to the majors make it unlikely that any effective change in the competitive
situation will be achieved by its workings. While the quality of entertain-
ment may to some extent have improved since the decree became effective,' 2 '
the price of admission and the powers of the local communities to select
their pictures remain much the same. Divorcement of exhibition from pro-
duction and distribution interests still remains as a possibility, although it
is not available to the Government until three years after entry of the consent
decree. Likewise, Congressional action is possible if the Sherman Act appears
incapable of offering a remedy for the situationyi 2 Perhaps, by the end of
the Government's enforced inactivity, enough time will have elapsed to allow,
concerning the decree, consummation of a judgment which at present must
remain only tentative.
119. See complaint, United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., el al., Civil Action
No. 87-273 (S. D. N. Y. 1938).
120. See Comment (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 854-56. At about the time it brought tie
divorcement action, the Government also brought suit to dissolve some of the larger un-
affiliated theater circuits. A temporary agreement has recently been reached by the
Government and the defendants in one of these suits, United States v. Schine Cain
Theaters, Civil Action No. 223 (W. D. N. Y. 1939). In this suit the Government al-
leged that the Schine circuit, a large unaffiliated chain of theaters, ld conspired with
various of the major producers to deprive independent, competing exhibitors of access to
films and drive them out of business. The Government in its suit sought dissolution of
the circuit. By the terms of the temporary agreement the circuit is not to acquire thea-
ters in specified localities for two years; the circuit is to divest itself of sixteen theaters
acquired since 1939; and trial is postponed until May 19, 1944. See (June 13, 1942) 147
MOo N PicruRa HEaLD 18.
121. XVhile some exhibitors concede some improvement in the quality of motion
pictures, they attribute it to nothing more than normal progress of the industry. See
N. Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1942, § 8, p. 4, col. 3.
122. The Motion Picture Research Council, for example, has contended that the pres-
ent Sherman Antitrust Law is totally inadequate to afford local communities the power
to select their own films. It urges prompt passage of the Neely bill, a proposed Con-
gressional measure, which would permit exhibitors a greater power of cancellation. See
N. Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1940, p. 9, col. 4; BERRAND, EvAixs, BLANcHsRD, op. cit. stspra
note 1, at 76.
